Biodiversity Since Rio: The Future of the Convention on Biological Diversity by Raustiala, K. & Victor, D.G.
BIODIVERSITY SINCE RIO: THE FUTURE OF THE 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor 




Reprinted from Environment, Volume 38, Number 4, May 1996. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently reviewed 
before publication. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those 
of the Institute, its National Member Organizations , or other organizations supporting the 
work. 
Environment , Volume 28 , Number 4, pp. 16- 20 and 37- 45. Reprinted with permission of 
the Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation. Published by Heldref Publications, 1319 
Eighteenth St., N.W. , Washington, D.C . 20036-1802. Copyright @1996. 
For copyright reasons the photographs that appeared in the original version have been 
omitted from this reprint. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means , electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any 
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright 
holder. 
Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria. 
Foreword 
What happens to international environmental agreements once they are 
signed, and how does the implementation of such agreements influence their 
effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the Implementation and 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC) Project at 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
In this essay, reprinted from Environment, Kal Raustiala and David G. 
Victor review developments within the Convention on Biological Diversity 
since its adoption in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development in Rio _de Janeiro. They also analyze the prospects 
for future implementation. The biodiversity agenda has expanded to in-
clude issues such as intellectual property rights and the regulation of the 
biotechnology industry. 
The authors caution that while the need for a comprehensive approach is 
important, the core issues that first inspired creation of the Convention - the 
preservation, conservation, and utilization of biological resources - risk being 
overshadowed by conflicts engendered by the agenda's expansion. Greater 
focus is needed on establishing a well-functioning system of implementation 
review, as well as greater attention to important biodiversity-rich habitats 
such as coral reefs, wetlands, and forests. 
Prof. Eugene B. Skolnikoff 
Project Co-leader 
International Environmental Commitments Project 
lll 
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Biodiversity Since Rio 
The Future of the Convention 
on 
B iodiversity is the diversity of species, genetic material, and 
ecosystems or, more generally, "the 
variability among living organisms."1 
Loss of biodiversity may pose the 
world's greatest ecological danger. 
Diversity is a foundation of natural 
ecosystems. Each distinct species is a 
unique evolutionary milepost that can-
not be replaced once it is lost. By 
many measures, the pace of destruction 
is fast and rising, primarily as a conse-
quence of habitat destruction. Con-
cerned about these trends, various 
environmental organizations and gov-
ernments sought negotiation of a glob-
al treaty to protect all forms of biodi-
versity. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) was opened for signa-
ture in 1992 at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro. 1bis article describes the prob-
lem of biodiversity loss, charts how the 
biodiversity agenda has expanded to 
include many other concerns such as 
access to genetic resources, intellectual 
property rights, and biotechnology, and 
reviews the operation of the CBD and 
its prospects. 
The Biodiversity Problem 
A central feature of the biodiversity 
debate is the recognition that diversi-
Biological Diversity 
ty is important coupled with disagree-
ment over the exact definition of bio-
diversity and the extent of the crisis. 2 
Most of the scientists working on the 
issue believe that today's storehouse 
of biological resources is being rapia-
ly depleted as human development 
increasingly encroaches on unique 
natural habitats that are rich in biodi-
versity. The vast majority of this 
diversity is unknown to modem sci-
ence: The 1.7 million described 
species represent only a small frac-
tion of the likely total, which is esti-
mated to be between 4 and 111 mil-
lion species. 3 A total of 1,622 
extinctions have been documented 
since 1600, and 26,106 species are 
currently considered "threatened."4 
Some claim that extinctions are cur-
rently occurring at rates nearing those 
of the great natural catastrophes of 
the Paleozoic and Mesozoic eras.' 
The natural background rate of 
extinction is approximately 1 species 
per year, while the current rate is per-
haps 100 or 1,000 times higher.6 The 
extinction rate will multiply 10-fold if 
all of the currently threatened species 
become extinct over the next century.7 
Others take a more sanguine view, 
however. Using similar data but com-
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paring the number of species lost 
with the overall pool of species, they 
conclude that the extinction rate is 
low, perhaps 0.027 percent per year 
(or less than 1 percent over 30 
years).8 Lack of systematic data 
remains a central obstacle to defining 
the biodiversity problem.9 
The number of species is a com-
monly used measure of diversity. But 
other measures may better reflect the 
characteristics of diversity that are 
most important and thus be more use-
ful in setting biodiversity protection 
priorities. 10 Alternatives include 
diversity in genetic code and taxa, as 
well as habitat measures that give 
special attention to mega-diverse 
areas. The policy implications differ 
depending on the particular measure 
that is selected. A species diversity 
measure directs policy to protect 
endangered or threatened species 
while a genetic diversity measure 
gives priority to species with espe-
cially different genes and recognizes 
that some species are more important 
than others. In general, however, nei-
ther of these measures has been used 
rigorously to set real policy priorities, 
which have tended to focus either on 
absolute protection (e.g., prohibition of 
activities that would further threaten 
already endangered species), the creation 
of nature reserves, or special protection 
for species with high public appeal. 
Humans contribute to the loss of 
biodiversity in many ways, including 
conversion of natural habitats, pollu-
tion, overfishing, and changing the cli-
mate.11 Much attention has been 
devoted to the conversion of biologi-
cally rich tropical forests . Scientists 
have shown that biodiversity is affect-
ed not only when wide swaths of vir-
gin forest are cleared but also when 
ecosystems are excessively fragment-
ed. OnP. >tudy of the Amazon basin, 
fc,. mstance, found that the area of 
fragmented forest is nearly three times 
greater than the actual deforested 
area. 
12 Even dominant species, which 
might be expected to survive in mod-
erately fragmented habitats, are likely 
to perish under such conditions. 13 
The case for protecting biodiversity 
has many dimensions. The direct eco-
nomic returns-mainly in pharmaceuti-
cal, agriculture, and biotechnology-
are numerous, though prone to over-
statement.14 The number and value 
of drugs such as aspirin and taxol (first 
identified in the wild but now synthe-
sized) are likely to be small.15 Examples 
abound of crop-threatening diseases 
such as wheat rust for which resistant 
strains were found in the wild, protected 
in gene banks, and crossbred into 
domesticated species. More productive 
and disease-resistant crop species have 
allowed agricultural production to grow 
faster than the human population even 
though the amount of land devoted to 
agriculture has remained roughly con-
stant. 16 'Xlhile many biodiversity-rich 
forests have been harvested for timber, 
a recent study of the Peruvian rain 
forest calculated that the net present 
value of sustainable rubber, fruit, and 
timber harvests is $6,820 per hectare-
more than six times the mill value of 
clear-cut timber.17 Sustainable uses 
that protect biodiversity can clearly be 
cost-effective, although the value of 
forests (which is based on location, 
markets, and products) may vary by a 
factor of 400. 18 
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Diversity also offers many indirect 
benefits. Diverse ecosystems are more 
resilient against genetic defects such 
as vulnerability to disease and pests. It 
has long been thought that simple 
ecosystems are less stable than com-
plex ones. 19 Controlled experiments 
strongly suggest that reduced biodi-
versity may also lower the productivity 
of ecosystems. 20 Methods for analyz-
ing . these indirect benefits are well-
known, but in practice valuing the full 
benefits of biodiversity is difficult and 
contentious.21 
Because the instrumental benefits 
of biodiversity are . uncertain and 
difficult to assess, the strongest case 
for preserving it may be its intrinsic 
value. The sheer number of species 
makes the marginal value of any 
individual species small (except in 
extraordinary cases, such as taxol-
producing trees, that are virtually 
impossible to identify a priori). But 
conceived holistically, biodiversity is 
essential to life as we know it, and 
outside narrow limits it may be inap-
propriate to compare marginal costs 
and benefits.22 Further, because 
extinctions are truly irreversible, cur-
rent generations may have a special 
role in passing on the planet in sub-
stantially the same condition as they 
received it.23 
Thus, while the economics are often 
indeterminant, the ethical conviction 
that biodiversity is valuable in its own 
right provides a- major impetus for pro-
tecting it. This conviction is reflected 
in the opening sentence of the CBD, 
which refers to the "intrinsic" value of 
biodiversity.24 The central role of 
ethics and the many potential uses of 
biodiversity (combined with weak 
arguments about what specifically to 
protect and how to do it) constitute 
the main obstacle to effective imple-
mentation of the CBD, however: It 
isn't always clear what to do and how 
to set priorities. This feature sets the 
biodiversity issue apart from interna-
tional efforts to deal with ozone 
depletion, acid rain, hazardous waste, 
and many other environmental con-
cerns---even climate change-where 
the problem is better defined and thus 
the menu of policy choices better 
focused. 
Setting the Biodiversity Agenda 
Preserving endangered species has 
long been a goal of international law. 
The first wildlife treaty, the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Birds Useful 
to Agriculture, dates to 1902.25 Today, 
several dozen international treaties pro-
tect particular species or vital habitats, 
usually denominated in a set of lists.26 
Several international organizations-
notably the quasi-nongovernmental 
World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
and the nongovernmental World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF)-have long 
been active in identifying endangered 
species, developing policy solutions, 
promoting the creation of protected 
areas, raising funds, implementing 
projects, and even helping to initiate 
and manage international treaties. 27 
The creation of the CBD stemmed 
from a perceived need for a treaty that 
would encompass all the extant conser-
vation accords and provide a coherent 
framework for coordinated action to 
preserve biodiversity worldwide. 28 Just 
as ecology has evolved from a frag-
mented to a holistic study of ecosys-
tems, 29 so international law has em-
braced a holistic approach. Whether 
the accompanying gains are worth the 
added complexity remains an open 
question, however. 
The biodiversity problem began to 
receive extensive scientific and media 
attention in the 1980s, much of it 
focused on the rapid destruction of 
tropical moist forests. Many leading 
tropical ecologists became publicists 
who argued that this generation's task 
was to save tropical wildlands.30 Public 
appeals by scientists in the popular 
press lent a sense of crisis to the biodi-
versity problem. While the influence of 
experts in environmental cooperation 
is often overstated, in this case scien-
tists, lawyers, and policy activists 
played the central role in placing biodi-
versity protection on the international 
agenda. The 1980s offered a window 
of opportunity31 through which activist 
experts pushed the biodiversity prob-
lem and their favored international 
solution: a new treaty that would pro-
tect biodiversity as a global stock, 
including the many unexplored species 
and ecosystems. This approach con-
trasted sharply with earlier treaties 
that focused only on particular named 
species and habitats. Within industrial-
ized countries, the constituency for 
nature conservation was active and the 
political climate favorable to new 
biodiversity initiatives. 
IUCN and the nongovernmental 
World Resources Institute (WRI) 
played leading roles in the effort to 
promote a biodiversity treaty and pre-
pared numerous background papers, 
policy strategies, and even a draft 
treaty text. Building on this prepara-
tory work and responding to pressure 
from industrialized countries, in 1987 
the governing council of the United 
Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) resolved to create a working 
group to explore such a convention. 32 
In 1991-contemporaneous with the 
negotiations on the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC)-formal multilateral nego-
tiations began on the CBD. A 
16-month deadline for finishing the 
work was set so that the treaty would 
be complete in time for UNCED. 
The rapid negotiations were marked 
by an unwieldy agenda and conflict 
over the central objectives and priori-
ties of the treaty. For industrialized 
countries, the goal was to promote con-
servation (though, as discussed below, 
this key concept is never actually 
defined in the treaty). For developing 
countries, the goal was broader: the 
sustainable use of biological resources, 
financial and technological transfers to 
assist in biodiversity protection, and the 
equitable distribution of the economic 
benefits of biological resources. The 
ever- broader agenda allowed packag-
ing of many issues into an omnibus 
negotiation. As in the Law of the Sea 
negotiations, a central aim of the devel-
oping countries has been to channel 
Northern interest in natural resources 
toward the creation of mechanisms for 
wealth and technology redistribution. 33 
Environment and development 
turned out to be a volatile mix. While 
the expanded agenda potentially creat-
ed greater scope for package deals, the 
negotiations sailed swiftly onto the 
shoals of North-South discord. The 
UNCED deadline allowed little time 
for compromises. Within the U.S. gov-
ernment, the biodiversity issue was 
increasingly dominated by conserva-
tives who were dubious about the prob-
lem and fearful that the treaty would 
influence debates over domestic envi-
ronmental protection.34 A memo from 
Vice President Dan Quayle's influential 
competitiveness council, leaked in 
April 1992, urged that the United States 
not sign the treaty without fundamental 
redrafting. The final negotiating session 
in May of that year crammed in an 
enormous number of topics, many of 
them aimed at making the treaty satis-
factory to the United States. The final 
document was necessarily a pastiche of 
vague commitments, ambiguous phras-
es, and some awkward compromises. 
Nonetheless, the treaty enjoys wide 
membership. A total of 156 nations 
signed the CBD at UNCED; enough 
formally confirmed their commitment 
and became parties to the treaty 
through ratification that it entered into 
force a mere 18 months later. By the 
end of 1995 there were 127 parties. 
The CBD's popularity stems in 19art 
from the United States' initial refusal 
to sign it. While incurring the wrath of 
environmentalists and diplomats the 
world over, U.S. hesitance also made 
signature and ratification a popular act 
of protest in many other nations. Mod-
est commitments that can be interpret-
ed in many ways also account for high 
membership in the treaty. Countries 
rich in biodiversity (primarily develop-
ing countries) see the CBD as a way to 
reaffirm their sovereign right to their 
genetic resources and to promote a 
more equitable sharing of the benefits 
from biodiversity.35 Of the first 30 
ratifications needed to bring the treaty 
into force , all but 5 were by develop-
ing countries; only one was by a major 
power-Japan.36 All industrialized 
countries acknowledged that the treaty 
had many flaws, mostly stemming 
from the expanded agenda, but only 
the United States elected to remain 
outside. (President Bill Clinton has 
since signed the CBD, but ratification 
remains stalled in Congress.) 
Commitments of the Convention 
The CBD is a landmark in that it is 
the first global treaty to explicitly take 
a comprehensive, ecosystems-based 
approach to the protection of biodiver-
sity. It also reaffirms state control over 
biological resources within national ter-
ritories, while simultaneously noting 
that biodiversity is the common con-
cern of all. (Resolving these two some-
times conflicting claims remains a 
major challenge.) The central objec-
tives of the treaty are threefold: the 
conservation of biological diversity, 
the promotion of its sustainable use, and 
the equitable sharing of the benefits of 
genetic resources. It is the last objec-
tive, with its clear redistributive impli-
cations, that was and remains the cause 
of much diplomatic strife. The basis of 
the perceived North-South bargain was 
summarized in the words of one devel-
oping country participant: "We have 
the biodiversity, they have the tech-
nology."37 The commitments made by 
participants may be grouped into four 
clusters that reflect the major issues. 
Direct Conservation Obligations 
The CBD is a true framework treaty. 
Aspirational in tone and well salted 
with caveats, It contains no targets, 
timetables, or lists of any kind. Some 
countries (led by France) pushed for 
lists of special areas, and their absence 
is viewed as a failing by some observers. 
Each party to the CBD is obligated 
to develop national programs for the 
conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity "in accordance with its 
particular conditions and capabili-
ties. "38 Parties must monitor compo-
nents of biodiversity and activities that 
are particularly deleterious, establish a 
system of protected areas, regulate 
their resources, and rehabilitate 
degraded areas. (These activities are 
called "in situ" conservation. "Ex situ" 
conservation, such as occurs in botani-
cal gardens, zoos, and the global net-
work of gene centers, also figures 
prominently but is clearly secon-
dary.39) Additionally, the treaty man-
dates that consideration of biodiver-
sity be included in all aspects of 
decisionmaking and that governments 
conduct environmental impact as-
sessments of proposed projects with 
ramifications for conservation. These 
commitments, while significant, are 
modest and did not provoke notable 
3 
debate. For most developed nations, 
they simply codify existing practices. If 
implemented properly, the extension 
of such practices to the developing 
world could substantially enhance 
protection of biodiversity, however. 
Technology and Financial Transfers 
Developing nations insisted that the 
obligations they undertake be coupled 
with financial and technical transfers 
to pay the incremental costs of com-
pliance. In return, developed nations 
insisted that access to technology and 
financial transfers only occur subject 
to mutually agreed terms. The focus 
on technology transfers further fed 
fears that the CBD was becoming a 
grab bag of items linked only tangen-
tially to actual conservation. 
The bargaining over financial terms 
and mechanisms was particularly divi-
sive. The key questions were what 
specifically would be covered by a 
biodiversity fund and what body 
would control it. Developed countries 
have committed themselves to provide 
financial resources to developing 
countries to meet the "agreed full 
incremental costs" of implementation. 
The issue of funding incremental costs 
has appeared in a number of environ-
mental treaties, most notably those on 
climate change and stratospheric 
ozone depletion. What exactly consti-
tutes an incremental cost is not defined 
in the CBD text and this is likely to be 
a source of considerable disagreement 
in the future. The pilot phase of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
shows the difficulty of defining and 
measuring the costs and benefits of 
biodiversity projects; in practice, the 
concept may be useless in setting 
priorities and funding levels.40 
Developing nations preferred to 
place the CBD fund under the control 
of the Conference of the Parties. 
Donor states adamantly refused, pre-
ferring to employ the newly created 
GEF, which was (and still is to a lesser 
degree) controlled by the donors. In 
the end, the donor states won this par-
ticular battle, but GEF was only desig-
nated the interim mechanism and then 
only if it was fully restructured to 
include a "democratic and transparent 
system of governance."41 Yet even at 
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the close of negotiations, ambiguity 
about the financing terms remained, 
and the delegations of 19 industrial-
ized nations joined in a declaration 
emphasizing their right to determine 
the amount of their individual and 
joint contributions.42 
Biotechnology Regulation and 
Biosafety 
One of the more controversial ele-
ments of the CBD is the commitment 
to ensure the safety of biotechnology, 
known as "biosafety." The treaty 
directs the parties to "establish or 
maintain means to regulate, manage, 
or control the risks associated with the 
use and release of living modified 
organisms resulting from biotechnol-
ogy. "43 For many developed nations 
(particularly the United States), the 
linkage between biodiversity and the 
safety of biotechnology is contrived. 
Indeed, a UNEP study commissioned 
in the period preceeding the treaty 
negotiations found almost no linkages 
between the two, with those that were 
found tending to benefit biodiver-
sity.44 The treaty text clearly presumes 
otherwise, however. 
The biosafety issue arose late in the 
negotiations through a proposal from 
Malaysia that received immediate 
widespread support from developing 
countries and many nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). While the 
biotechnology industry tends to be 
closely regulated in industrialized 
countries (mostly through national 
laws on laboratory practices and the 
release of living modified organisms 
outside the laboratory), there are few 
international regulations governing 
these activities. The language on 
biosafety and the specter of possibly 
draconian international regulation 
remain sources of consternation for 
nations actively engaged in biotech-
nology. These countries perceive 
biotechnology as an industry with 
great potential that could be ham-
pered by regulation through an un-
wieldy global forum with little demon-
strated expertise. Despite these 
concerns, in 1995 the parties agreed to 
convene a working group to develop a 
legally binding protocol on biosafety 
by 1998.45 
Ownership of Biodiversity 
The CBD consolidates the role of 
government in protecting and main-
taining resources and reaffirms that 
states have sovereign rights over their 
own biological resources. 46 Yet the 
convention simultaneously propounds 
a more global view of biological 
resources, stating that conservation is 
the "common concern" of all humanity 
and that states are responsible for using 
biodiversity in a sustainable manner. 
The uneasy coexistence between these 
two aims leaves unresolved how to 
divide the benefits that flow from 
biodiversity. The problem is most 
acute when biological resources have 
been improved through innovation. 
International intellectual property 
rights (IPR) law-which protects easily 
copied innovations-became a central 
issue in the negotiations because even 
though biological resources from 
developing countries form the basis for 
many pharmaceutical, agricultural, and 
biotechnological innovations, little or 
none of the resulting profits flow to the 
source country.47 One report estimates 
that the developing world would gain 
$5 .4 billion per year if multinational 
food, seed, and pharmaceutical firms 
paid royalties for local knowledge and 
plant varieties.48 A few salient exam-
ples drive a debate regularly punctuated 
with terms like "piracy" and "robbery." 
The Indian neem tree is the source of 
more than 50 U.S. patents for products 
ranging from contraceptives to pesti-
cides. Challenges are under way in 
Europe and the United States to revoke 
patents issued to W. R Grace (a major 
pharmaceutical and chemical firm) on 
the grounds that its neem-based insecti-
cides and fungicides are not Grace 
innovations but rather are derived 
from age-old Indian techniques. 49 
Extending intellectual property 
rights to genetic innovations is highly 
controversial. Some, including a 
diverse group of religious leaders, 
oppose the patenting of §enes-God's 
innovation-altogether.5 Researchers 
are also concerned about receiving 
proper rewards for work that leads to 
patentable innovations. Funding agen-
cies, owners of genetic databases, and 
researchers are taking steps to develop 
model agreements that protect intel-
lectual property and share the benefits 
of genetic research. 51 
While Western governments defend 
IPR law as both just and efficient, 
many developing nations view it as 
fundamentally unjust, a means by 
which resources and wealth are trans-
ferred from South to North with the 
imprimatur of legality. Many have only 
grudgingly accepted the stricter IPR 
rules contained in recent trade agree-
ments such as the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), part of the 
accord that established the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). These 
rules require WTO members to 
enforce intellectual property rights 
such as with patents and copyrightsn 
Through the UN's Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) and the 
"farmers' rights" movement, critics 
have opposed the extension of IPR to 
seeds and other agricultural prod-
ucts.53 The farmers ' rights movement 
stresses the role that farmers-particu-
larly in the South-play in improving 
plant varieties. The current structure of 
IPR ignores the slow and incremental 
improvements wrought by farmers and 
favors the more identifiable (and 
sometimes derivative) advances made 
by large multinational seed firms. The 
CBD strikes an uneasy compromise 
between Northern and Southern 
views: It commits the parties to coop-
erate to ensure that patents and other 
intellectual property rights "subject to 
national legislation and international 
law . . . are supportive of and do not 
run counter to [the CBD's] objec-
tives. "54 What this means in practice is 
unclear. The text seems to support the 
existing IPR structure, but it simulta-
neously appears to privilege the 
objectives of the CBD, including the 
equitable sharing of the benefits from 
using biological resources. Nonethe-
less, while IPR was a major negotiating 
topic in the CBD, how the issue 
unfolds in other venues, notably the 
WTO, will probably matter more. 
While developing nations face 
significant hurdles in the revision of 
international IPR law, they may have 
greater success reforming access rights 
to the original biological inputs. Plant 
genetic resources, for which the 
arguments are most fully developed, 
illustrate the major issues. Previous 
international agreements on the 
subject, such as the nonbinding FAO 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Re-
sources (1983 ), had enshrined the 
principle of free access, which en-
hances the ability of major firms and 
scientists to obtain genetic inputs 
without the obligation to share bene-
fits. Issues of access and benefits are 
central to plant breeding, where the 
farmers' rights concept first emerged 
as a counterpart and challenge to plant 
breeders' rights. Current international 
law grants extensive protection to 
plant breeders who improve plant 
varieties through crossbreeding wild 
and improved strains.55 Negotiations 
are under way within FAO's Commis-
sion on Plant Genetic Resources to 
develop schemes for benefit sharing 
that would respect farmers' rights. 
These negotiations may make more 
progress than the CBD because they 
are much more focused, considering 
only issues related to plants (primarily 
major food crops). Nonetheless, a 
system for access and benefit sharing 
remains elusive.56 And, in practice, 
restricting access to biological re-
sources will be extremely difficult: 
Although the Chinese kept their 
silkworm monopoly for many centu-
ries, they ultimately lost it to two 
enterprising Nestorian monks.57 
The battle over rights within the 
CBD and FAO may threaten the oper-
ation of the international network of 
gene banks and agricultural research 
centers, though genetic resources held 
ex situ that were gathered prior to the 
treaty's entry into force are not cov-
ered by the CBD.58 These banks have 
also traditionally operated under a 
principle of open access to their exten-
sive collections; such access has been 
instrumental in improving crop yields 
and disease resistance worldwide. 
Some of the proposed benefit-sharing 
schemes would require tracking down 
the original suppliers of a genetic sam-
ple and giving them a portion of the 
profits from the final product. Given 
that modern plant hybrids are built on 
the crossbreeding of hundreds of 
genetic samples, the feasibility of this 
approach is limited. The developing 
countries pushing for such systems-
who are already major beneficiaries of 
the network-are unlikely to realize 
any appreciable benefit. In short, the 
CBD has sown confusion, threatening 
to overturn existing rules of access; an 
alternative system has yet to emerge. 
While battles over access ensue 
within UN agencies, private arrange-
ments may become more common. 
For instance, the pharmaceutical giant 
Merck gained access to chemical 
extracts from Costa Rica's National 
Biodiversity Institute (INBio) in 
exchange for some $1.1 million and an 
unspecified percentage of future royal-
ties.59 Though few similar agreements 
have emerged thus far, such bilateral 
deals represent an alternative, though 
limited, path to the protection of biodi-
versity. Recent advances in drug 
design have dramatically reduced the 
role of large-scale plant screening in 
providing leads on valuable pharma-
ceutical. While the expected econom-
ic value of the (unknown) genetic 
resources can provide some incentives 
for biodiversity protection, it is mis-
guided to expect these concerns to dra-
matically further such protection. 
The debate over access and bene-
fits has raised fundamental questions 
about the status and ownership of bio-
logical resources, as well as the com-
patibility of Western law, which is 
based on individual property and 
market-based exchange, with tradi-
tional cultures that pool and exchange 
knowledge without personal owner-
ship. While these issues are clearly 
relevant to protecting biodiversity, 
their inclusion in the CBD signifi-
cantly raises the stakes and thus the 
political conflict surrounding the 
treaty. These debates will be slow and 
divisive: Now that these issues are on 
the biodiversity agenda, many expect 
them to be part of any package deal 
within the CBD. The protection of 
biodiversity-the erstwhile aim of the 
CED-will suffer from this conflict. 
New Institutions 
In addition to elaborating a set of 
commitments and goals, the CBD 
establishes several new international 
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institutions to carry out its mandate 
and continue the cooperative process. 
The flexible and often vague structure 
of the treaty's rules and commitments 
will be animated and focused by 
debate within these institutions. 
Conference of the Parties 
The primary new body is the Con-
ference of the Parties (COP), which 
makes all formal decisions regarding 
the treaty. 60 Formal membership is 
limited to the actual parties, although 
important nonparties such as the Unit-
ed States also play a role as observers. 
The COP has a number of responsibil-
ities that are mentioned specifically in 
the CBD, including examining new 
scientific data on biodiversity, examin-
ing the issues of liability and redress 
for damage to biodiversity, defining 
incremental costs, choosing the appro-
priate level of financing for the finan-
cial mechanism, and considerin~ the 
need for a biosafety protocol.6 Ar-
guably, the main achievement of the 
CBD so far has been to create this 
ongoing body through which global 
biodiversity issues can be addressed. 
The COP, which held its first session 
in 1994, meets annually. 
Financial Mechanism 
The CBD includes a provision to 
transfer financial resources to develop-
ing countries to pay the "agreed full 
incremental costs" of implementation. 
Because donor states feared the cre-
ation of yet another international insti-
tution, the CBD will rely on GEF as its 
interim financial mechanism until at 
least 1997.62 GEF is already disburs-
ing money on biodiversity projects 
according to criteria and priorities 
established by the COP.63 
According to the CBD's definition, 
the developed countries consist of the 
members of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) plus Monaco but minus the 
Czech Republic and Mexico.64 An 
attempt to define developing countries 
failed; by default the UN list is used.65 
A third group comprises countries 
with economies in transition that 
emphatically declare they are not 
developing but do not wish to assume 
the financial obligations of developed 
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countries (though they may voluntarily 
assume those obligations). Virtually 
the same distinctions are employed in 
the climate treaty.66 Positions on 
GEF's council, which governs GEF-
financed activities, are earmarked for 
developing, developed, and transi-
tional countries.67 These distinctions 
are elastic, however: Several develop-
ing countries, including Brazil, China, 
and Egypt, have been both contribu-
tors and recipients of GEF funding. 
Clearing-House Mechanism 
As required by the CBD, 68 the 
COP has established a clearing-house 
mechanism to operate in a pilot phase 
from 1996 to 1997. The mechanism is 
charged with promoting international 
scientific and technical cooperation, 
disseminating information on the 
lessons learned during implementa-
tion, and facilitating the transfer of 
technology.69 While these functions 
are important, it remains to be seen if 
a formal institution can contribute to 
them effectively; there is little guid-
ance from other international institu-
tions on how to do so. Most technol-
ogy and information diffuse through 
markets and scientific collaboration. 
Absent large resources with which to 
intervene-such as to fund sorely 
needed taxonomists in developing 
countries-the clearing-house mecha-
nism may prove inconsequential. 
Secretariat 
The CBD also creates a secretariat 
to arrange meetings, prepare reports, 
coordinate with other international 
organizations, and so forth. 70 The 
form and function of this body mirror 
those of a number of other new 
secretariats. Secretariats vary in size 
and effectiveness but are considered 
necessary components of any compre-
hensive and complex formal regime.71 
Many hoped that coordination 
among secretariats would improve if 
they were concentrated in Geneva, the 
interim home of the CBD and climate 
secretariats as well as several others. In 
1995, however, Montreal was chosen 
as the permanent site for the CBD 
secretariat, while the climate secretari-
at is currently in the midst of a move to 
Bonn. The costs of the CBD secretar-
iat (and those of some developing 
country participants) are covered by a 
trust fund into which all parties 
contribute according to a scale of 
assessments similar to the UN scale. 
Advisory Body 
The CBD creates one subsidiary body 
to provide assistance to the COP as 
neededn The Subsidiary Body on Sci-
entific, Technical, and Technological 
Advice (SBSTTA) is open to all parties 
and is multidisciplinary in focus. Its 
tasks are to provide advice and assess-
ments relating to biodiversity, produce 
policy analyses, and monitor research on 
biodiversity protection. The SBSTTA 
cannot take initiatives beyond those 
necessary to fulfill its mandate and it 
may only report to the COP itself. In its 
first year of operation, it has already 
helped the COP set priorities. Unlike 
the FCCC, the CBD did not also 
create a subsidiary body on implemen-
tation. Such a body may be needed as 
national reporting begins and future 
protocols are negotiated, however. 
The Problematic Road Ahead 
The CBD has received a lukewarm 
reception in international legal and 
environmental circles, and few support-
ers have stepped up to defend it.n 
While its holistic approach breaks some 
new ground, the treaty is riddled with 
ambiguity and omission. The imple-
mentation and, most importantly, the 
interpretation of the treaty will matter 
significantly-perhaps more so than in 
other, more specific international 
accords. The CBD is young and per-
haps flexible but clearly lacks focus. 
Focus and Protocols 
The lack of focus in the treaty reflects 
the absence of agreement on two major 
concepts: biodiversity and conserva-
tion. With respect to biodiversity, until 
there is agreement on what is to be 
protected, it will be difficult to de-
velop effective rules and guidelines for 
protection. As noted above, differing 
definitions of diversity yield markedly 
different policy priorities. Insofar as 
the treaty aims to protect biodiversity, 
its future lies less in the development 
of specific rules than in the consensual 
interpretation of principles, concepts, 
and obligations. Getting a better 
handle on biodiversity, improving 
relevant indicators, and creating an 
acceptable prioritization of problems 
will be essential if the treaty is to fulfill 
its declared mandates. 
Conservation is similarly problem-
atic. The CBD endorses the concepts 
of sustainable use and the sound man-
agement of biological resources for 
human use and betterment. But the 
treaty's clear statement of the "instrin-
sic" worth of biodiversity reflects a 
preservationist view that subsumes 
human needs within a broader set of 
ethical concerns. Which vision of 
conservation will prevail is unclear. 
Facing the thorny problems of 
defining and implementing these 
central concepts will be crucial if the 
treaty is ever to become an effective 
vehicle for the protection of biodiver-
sity. At the moment, the parties 
appear to be pursuing an alternative 
strategy to gain focus: the promulga-
tion of protocols. The protocol nearest 
on the horizon addresses an issue with 
limited impact on biodiversity (how-
ever defined): biosafety and the 
regulation of biotechnology. 
At the second meeting of the COP, 
the parties agreed to develop a legally 
binding protocol on biosafety, espe-
cially the transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms (LMOs), 
by 1998.74 Leading biotechnology 
nations (above all the United States) 
consider this move unnecessary and an 
example of the misuse of the treaty 
process. There is merit to this view: 
While biosafety may indeed be a topic 
worthy of international attention, it is 
not clear why the CBD is the proper 
venue for it. There is very little evi-
dence that biosafety problems, partic-
ularly the transboundary movement of 
LMOs, represent a serious threat to 
biodiversity. The 1,016 page Global 
Biodiversity Assessment, UNEP's offi-
cial scientific review of the biodiversity 
issue, devoted a scant nine pages to 
LMOs and did not mention trans-
boundary movement. The disturbance 
of ecosystems by "natural" alien 
species-addressed in the treaty but 
currently receiving little formal atten-
tion-is of far greater importance than 
that of LMOs. The fact that biosafety 
is high on the agenda of the CBD 
while forest issues are sidelined under-
scores the misguided course of the 
convention. Pursuing a biosafety pro-
tocol is a sure recipe for conflict over 
an issue that is ultimately of tangential 
importance to the core goals of the 
treaty. Such conflict has already cast a 
shadow on other aspects of the CBD, 
such as IPR law. 
The push for a biosafety protocol is 
occurring in parallel with the formula-
tion and implementation of nonbind-
ing international guidelines. Develop-
ed with the leadership of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, and 
now under the auspices of UNEP, 
these guidelines address the transport 
and use of genetically engineered 
products. In September 1995, Argen-
tina became the first developing 
country to adopt them, in the form of 
a bilateral agreement with the United 
Kingdom. Industry remains keen to 
pursue the voluntary adoption of the 
guidelines in lieu of a multilateral, 
binding protocol under the CBD. The 
specificity and speed of adoption (as 
well as flexibility) of such voluntary 
measures may well make them more 
effective than a legally binding proto-
col would be. The negotiation of a 
protocol might even be eclipsed if the 
guidelines prove highly effective.75 
Paradoxically, the opposition to a 
biosafety protocol is likely to lead to 
its creation. The South, which has 
little interest in fostering the biotech-
nology industry, correctly perceives 
this as an issue with great bargaining 
potential. The issue thus illustrates 
one of the pitfalls of the "open-access 
regime" that characterizes UN diplo-
macy. Universal participation ensures 
that the many different concerns and 
interests of the participants are re-
flected in the agenda. However, in a 
loosely conceptualized forum like the 
CBD, the result can be a "kitchen 
sink" treaty that addresses any number 
of concerns not on the basis of their 
merits but in recognition of the 
prerogatives of the participants. When 
consensus on the scope or even the 
purpose of the accord is missing, wide 
participation can result in unproduc-
tive sidetracking and a loss of focus. 
One bright spot in the CBD's 
effort to achieve focus is the Jakarta 
Mandate, agreed on at the second 
COP meeting in 1995. It requires the 
creation of an expert group to recom-
mend ways to ~rotect marine and 
coastal diversity. 6 If the biosafety 
initiative stalls, coastal and marine 
issues could become a central aspect 
of the CBD's work. More than 75 
percent of the world fish catch cur-
rently comes from coastal areas, and 
half the extant phyla of animals live 
exclusively in marine environments. 
Pollution, mining and drilling, ozone 
depletion, climate change, invasions of 
alien species from ballast, and over-
fishing are compounding the threats to 
marine life.77 The agenda is broad, but 
these issues are not adequately cov-
ered elsewhere and the CBD could 
make a substantial contribution. 
National Priorities 
The most important actions to con-
serve biodiversity must be taken at the 
national level and below. The CBD 
will make the most progress by foster-
ing a decentralized process in which 
nations identify areas for policy action, 
set standards, and report their actions 
within the CBD framework. A system 
of national planning and reporting 
coupled with systematic international 
review can promote such a process, 
helping countries to focus their priori-
ties and learn from each other's suc-
cesses and failures. While the experi-
ence with review systems has been 
mixed, the climate regime has devel-
oped a fairly sophisticated national 
reporting system that appears to be 
functioning well. 78 A similar system 
could do much to alleviate the prob-
lems of the CBD. Yet a well-func-
ioning system of national reports 
would also shed glaring light on the 
difficulties of the convention as draft-
ed, highlighting the ambiguities it con-
tains. The first steps are thus critical 
for the evolution of the regime. 
The CBD requires countries to sub-
mit reports, and in 1995 the parties 
finally agreed to loose guidelines for 
their preparation.79 The first reports, 
due in 1997, will focus on national 
measures to implement the CBD's 
obligations to promote conservation 
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and the sustainable use of biodiversity. 
It is disappointing that these steps 
were not taken earlier-UNEP devel-
oped guidelines for the preparation of 
countz studies and inventories in 
1993. WR! and IUCN have also been 
active in helpinf nations prepare stud-
ies and plans.8 Thirty-four countries 
have initiated national biodiversity 
studies, nearly half of which are 
already complete. Connecting this 
work to the formal CBD process must 
now wait until at least 1997. SBSTTA 
will oversee the reporting process. 
Perhaps the most impressive prod-
uct of the biodiversity regime has been 
the comprehensive Global Biodiversity 
Assessment released at the second COP 
meeting. It is similar in purpose to the 
two assessments conducted by the bet-
ter known Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change associated with the 
climate regime. Observers of the two 
conventions will learn much about the 
role and influence of science by com-
paring these two analogous efforts. 
Forests 
Forests are perhaps the single most 
important repository of biodiversity 
(other contenders include coral reefs 
and the oceans).82 Yet the issue of 
forests has been delicately skirted by 
the parties to the CBD. Brazil, Ma-
laysia, and other nations with vast (but 
shrinking) tropical forests are deeply 
suspicious of efforts to address inter-
nationally what they consider to be 
sovereign domestic resources. Many 
developing countries feel that the issue 
of forests is and should be addressed 
elsewhere. Several large NGOs have 
suggested a forests protocol, but the 
proposal appears dead on arrival. 
The Commission on Sustainable 
Development, a UN body created in the 
wake of UNCED, has established an 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, to 
which the CBD has made a formal 
statement on the importance of forest 
biodiversity.83 The panel was organized 
by Canada and Malaysia, two countries 
that many environmental groups con-
sider the worst despoilers of forest 
lands. Forestry is on the agenda in more 
than a dozen other fora as well. At the 
official governmental level, members 
of the International Tropical Timber 
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Organization recently adopted new 
agreements for timber management.84 
In addition, various smaller initiatives 
aimed at European forests, temperate 
and boreal forests, and so on are under 
way. At the private level, among sever-
al others, is the World Commission on 
Forests and Sustainable Development, 
begun in 1992.85 Forests will again be 
on the CBD agenda in 1997, but these 
alternative fora have enabled countries 
critical of CBD's involvement with 
forests to claim that the issue is being 
adequately addressed elsewhere. The 
forests issue helped catapult the biodi-
versity problem to prominence, but it 
has also led forested nations, especially 
in the tropics, to be wary of internation-
al biodiversity efforts. Because forests 
provide so much critical habitat, 
however, they are a proper if not 
central concern of any treaty designed 
to protect biodiversity. Failing to 
address forests within the CBD is akin 
to failing to address coal within the 
convention on climate change. 
U.S. Ratification 
Although the United States was the 
single most important nation in the 
negotiation of the CBD, it currently 
remains outside the treaty. While the 
United States is not especially rich in 
biodiversity, its participation in any 
international environmental accord is 
important. It has one of the world's 
best developed systems of wildlife 
preservation, and U.S. expertise (chan-
neled through a well-developed system 
of national reporting and review) 
could significantly improve the stan-
dards, national inventories, and pro-
grams of other parties. The central 
position of the country's biotechnol-
ogy industry also makes U.S. partici-
pation critical. Without it, there is a 
real danger that U.S. interests them-
selves will be harmed: Soon after the 
U.S. decision not to sign the CBD, 
Venezuela stopped signing new 
agreements with U.S. scientific insti-
tutions interested in gathering biolop-
cal materials in Venezuelan forests.8 
One year after UNCED, President 
Clinton signed the CBD, reversing the 
position of President Bush. Although 
partly a response to shifting political 
winds, this move also reflected a reap-
praisal of the merits of U.S. partici-
pation by the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries. These indus-
tries, which initially supported the 
decision to reject the treaty, are now 
strongly in favor of ratification.87 They 
perceive the risks of staying out-and 
thereby allowing a biosafety protocol 
to be developed without U.S. input-
as being greater than joining. How-
ever, the treaty remains unpopular in 
conservative circles. Various senators 
have expressed concern about a num-
ber of the CBD' s provisions, especially 
its effect on domestic legislation (such 
as the Endangered Species Act, which 
will be reauthorized soon and is likely 
to be weakened).88 Many members of 
Congress are also concerned about the 
vagueness and ambiguity of the text. 89 
At the moment, ratification of the 
treaty is in limbo. 
Conclusion 
For better or worse, the CBD's 
agenda is much larger and more 
ambitious than global conservation. 
There is cause for hope, however: The 
system of national reports should help 
set priorities and focus activities, and 
the Jakarta Mandate directs attention 
to the critical and insufficiently ad-
dressed issue of marine biodiversity. 
But as an instrument for preserving 
biodiversity, the CBD has serious 
problems at both the grand level of 
principles and the practical level of 
implementation. Pressure to address 
these problems is lacking for several 
reasons. First, a significant body of 
wildlife and ecosystems law already 
exists, which to some extent takes the 
heat off the CBD. Second, the loss of 
biodiversity is largely invisible. There 
is little of catastrophic import-like 
the melting of the Antarctic ice 
shelf-to seize the public imagination 
or keep governments concerned. 
Third, the CBD has long been 
eclipsed by the FCCC and this is 
unlikely to change. For governments, 
NGOs, and UN agencies alike, 
biodiversity is still minor-league 
environmental diplomacy. 
For these reasons, a special effort 
must be made to move the CBD in a 
positive direction. The ambiguity of 
the treaty can become a virtue in the 
hands of skilled negotiators and 
committed governments. This will not 
occur, however, without a sustained 
focus on core conservation issues as 
opposed to sidelines like biosafety. 
Without that focus, the treaty will 
probably fall victim to the endless 
conflicts that plagued the Law of the 
Sea negotiations-and that is unlikely 
to provide security for the Earth's 
biological resources. 
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